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DMDE, CONQUER, AND PAY: CML 
COMPENSATION FOR WARTIME DAMAGES 
ROSEMARY E. LIBERA * 
Abstract: The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) 
was created by the United Nations (U.N.) in order to compensate 
monetarily those injured personally and financially by Iraq's illegal 
actions during the Persian Gulf War (Gulf War). This Note compares 
the situation in Iraq to that in the former Yugoslavia and considers 
why such a compensation system was instated in Iraq but not in the 
Balkans. The author concludes that the UNCC will serve as 
precedent for the imposition of civil liability for wartime damages 
and delineates those circumstances under which such a civil 
compensation system could exist. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mter the Gulf War, the United Nations cease-fire agreement 
forced Iraq to assume civil liability for the damage that it caused dur-
ing its illegal invasion of Kuwait. I It also imposed upon Iraq an un-
precedented2 civil compensation system directed at monetarily rec-
ompensing those individuals, entities, and governments that sustained 
losses during the war.3 Mter the break-up of the former fugoslavia, in 
contrast, the U.N. did not impose civil liability on Serbia, the aggres-
sor state, even though the circumstances of the two conflicts were 
similar.4 This Note treats the Gulf War civil compensation system as 
international precedent and considers, first, the circumstances under 
which that precedent might extend to nations other than Iraq and, 
second, the potential deterrent effects of imposing a civil compensa-
tion system as part of a cease-fire agreement. 
* Rosemary E. Libera is the Editor-in-Chief of the Boston College International and Com-
parative Law Review. 
1 Resolution 687, 30 INT'LL. MATERIALS 846, 852,,16 (1991). 
2 Carlos Alzamora, TIu! lJ.N. Compensation Commission: An Overview, in THE UNITED NA-
TIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 1, 3 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1995). 
3 Resolution 687, supra note 1, at 852,' 18 (1991). 
4 See Frederic L. Kirgis,Jr., Claims Settlement and tlu! United Nations Legal Structum, in THE 
UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 103, 114. 
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Part I of this Note compares the Gulf War with the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia and highlights the similarities between the U.N.'s 
treatment of each state during their respective conflicts. It also details 
the Gulf War civil compensation system, the claims that victims have 
filed, and the awards that the compensatory body has made. Part II 
considers the Gulf War compensation system's value as international 
precedent for imposing civil compensation for wartime damages and 
the attendant limitations on that precedent. Through a comparison 
of the economic situations in Iraq and in the former Yugoslavia, it also 
attempts to delineate the nature of the limited circumstances where 
civil compensation for wartime damages is economically feasible. Fi-
nally, Part II examines the extent to which the U.N.'s authority to in-
tervene in international conflicts limits its ability to impose civilliabil-
ity. 
Part III of this Note argues that the economic costs of illegal 
conflict increased significantly for certain nations with the creation of 
the Gulf War compensation system and discusses the potential deter-
rent effects of this increase in cost. This Note concludes that the Gulf 
War civil compensation system was not an isolated display of U.N. 
authority and suggests that the overall success of the system will en-
courage the U.N. to employ it in the future. 
I. HISTORY OF THE GULF WAR AND THE BREAK-UP OF THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA 
On August 2, 1990, motivated by oil, territorial disputes, and 
Saddam Hussein's quest for power, Iraq invaded the sovereign nation 
of Kuwait, thereby beginning the GulfWar.5 In less than nine months, 
Iraq caused as much as $300 billion6 in damages to individuals, enti-
ties, and governments located in or associated with Kuwait, Iraq, and 
the neighboring countries.7 Iraq detained, tortured, and killed indi-
viduals and destroyed personal, real, and business property, as well as 
the environment.s 
5 ALBERTO BIN, ET AL., DESERT STORM: A FORGOTTEN WAR 16 (1998). 
6 All monetary values throughout this Note are in United States dollars. 
7 The Clairns, in The United Nations Compensation Commission [hereinafter UNCC], 
athttp://www.uTlog.ch/uncc/ (last modifiedJan. 29, 2001). 
B Adel Omar Asem, Establishment of the U.N. Compensation Commission: The Kuwaiti Gov-
ernment Perspective, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 
45,46-55. 
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A comparable conflict erupted in the former Yugoslavia around 
the same time as the Gulf War began in the Middle East.9 lligoslavia's 
many provinces, separated by culture and politics, considered forming 
independent nations.1° Popular sentiment prevailed when Slovenia 
and Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia in June 1991;11 Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Bosnia) followed suit shortly thereafter, seceding in 
February 1992.12 The secession of Croatia and Bosnia created a Ser-
bian minority in each of the new nations.13 The Serbs in those prov-
inces, supported by Serbia, opposed tlle secession,14 and fighting soon 
escalated between the Serbs and the Muslims and Croats both in Ser-
bia and in the surrounding territories of the former Yugoslavia.15 As 
in the Gulf War, the aggressor nation, Serbia, inflicted severe personal 
and property damages on individuals, entities, and governments dur-
ing the course of the conflict.16 Damage to infrastructure in Bosnia 
has been estimated at between $40 and $50 billion,17 and approxi-
mately 200,000 deaths resulted from fighting in that country. IS 
A. The U.N. s Reaction 
The countries involved in each of these conflicts are members of 
the U.N. and thus, are subject to the provisions of the U.N. Charter.19 
Iraq and Yugoslavia, now consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, have 
been members since 1945, the year of the U.N.'s inception.2o Kuwait 
joined in 1963, and Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia joined in May 
9 Alex N. Dragnich, Bosnia-Herz.egovina: A Case Stud), of A.narch), in the Third World. 3 
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMPo L. 163, 166 (1995). Other causes of the conflicts in \'ilgoslavia 
included struggles over the scarce resoun'es of productive capacity, infrastructure, and 
hard currency. CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 83 (John B. 
Allcock et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA]. 
10 Dragnich, supra note 9, at 167. 
11 [d. 
12 [d. at 169. 
13 [d. at 168,169. 
14 [d. at 168-69. 
15 Philip J. Cohen, Ending the War and Securing Peace in the Former Yugoslavia, 6 PACE 
INT'L L. REv. 19,30 (1994). 
16 STEVEN L. BURG & PAUL S. SHOUP, THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 169-71 
(1999) (damage to individuals); CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 9, at 84 
(damage to infrastructure). 
Ii CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 9, at 84. 
18 [d. at 38. Contra BURG & SHOUP, supra note 16, at 169-71 (discussing the range of 
death estimates). 
19 United Nations, List of Member States, at http://www.un. org/Overview/unmember. 
html (last modified Dec. 18,2000). 
20 [d. 
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1992.21 Article 2 of the U.N. Charter requires U.N. members to "re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state. "22 U.N. members who employ force illegally become subject to 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter which governs threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.23 Article 39, found in 
Chapter VII, grants the Security Council the power to decide what 
measures to take pursuant to Articles 41 (sanctions) and Article 42 
(use of force) "to maintain or restore international peace and secu-
rity. "24 The acts of aggression by Iraq and Yugoslavia brought both of 
those nations within the purview of Chapter VII.25 
Initially, the Iraqis and the Serbs suffered similar fates for their 
violations of the U.N. Charter. The U.N., for example, subjected Iraq 
to sanctions and an economic embargo beginning in August 1990 in 
order to pressure Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.26 The U.N. forbid 
Iraq from exporting its own or Kuwaiti oil and permitted it to import 
only food and medicine.27 Likewise, the U.N. imposed an arms em-
bargo on the Balkans in order to prevent the further armament of 
Serbian rebels.28 Also, in May 1992, U.N. Resolution 757 "banned all 
trading and financial links with [Yugoslavia], froze all the repuhlic's 
overseas assets, forbade all types of cooperation, and imposed a ban 
on all commercial flights and maritime links to and from [Yugosla-
via] ."29 
Although Iraq and Yugoslavia are members of the U.N. and re-
ceived similar treatment during their respective conflicts, the U.N.'s 
post-war treatment of these nations has varied considerably. The U.N. 
21Id. 
22 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, pal"a. 4; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 2., para. 3 ("All Members 
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that interna-
tional peace and security, and justice, aloe not endangel"ed."). 
23 U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51 (Chapter VII). 
24 U.N. CHARTER art. 39. 
25 Resolution 687, supra note 1, at 852, , 16 (Iraq); Kirgis, supra note 4, at 113 (l'ltgosla-
via). 
26 ABBAS ALNASRAWI, THE ECONOMY OF IRAQ: OIL, WARS, DESTRUCTION OF DEVELOP-
MENT AND PROSPECTS, 1950-2010, at 118 (1994). 
27 Rosemary Hollis, Overvieu~ in OIL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF 6 
(Rosemary Hollis ed., 1998). 
28 Cohen, supra note 15, at 38-39. One difference does exist between the Chapter VII 
positions taken by the U.N. toward Iraq and ll.igoslavia: the Security Council never ex-
pressly found that Yugoslavia had committed an act of open aggression. See Kirgis, supra 
note 4, at 113, 113 n.46. Since the U.N. took Chapter VII action against both countries, 
however, the difference is not crucial. See id. 
29 CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 9, at 254. 
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has established a mechanism of civil compensation, the United Na-
tions Compensation Commission, for the victims of the Gulf War,30 
whereas no such system of civil compensation exists for those who suf-
fered very similar losses at the hands of their Balkan aggressors.31 
Iraq's oil wealth accounts for the difference in the U.N.'s post-war 
treatment of Iraq and Yugoslavia.32 As Jean-Claude Aime, the U.N. 
diplomat in charge of the UNCC effort, said, "[t]hese claims are here 
because Iraq has oil. If Iraq didn't have oil, there would be no 
claims. "33 Serbia, on the other hand, is "oil-poor, land-locked, and 
[was] economically dependent on Croatia and Slovenia."34 For this 
reason, there are no claims against Serbia.35 
B. The UNCC 
In the U.N. cease-fire agreement that ended the Gulf War, Reso-
lution 687, Iraq assumed liability for "any direct loss, damage, includ-
ing environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or 
injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations" that re-
sulted from its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. 36 The 
agreement, signed in April 1991, also required Iraq to compensate 
monetarily those individuals, entities, and governments presenting 
valid claims against the country and established a fund (Compensa-
tion Fund) from which the claims would be paid.37 Finally, the UNCC 
was created to process claims and to award damages.38 The cease-fire 
addressed the fund's solvency by specitying that, once Iraq was al-
30 Alzamora, supra note 2, at 4. 
31 Kirgis, supra note 4, at 113-14. 
32 Bhushan Balll'ee, Gulf War Claims Against Iraq Could Top $100 Billion, With Deadlines 
Nearing, WALL ST.]"June 29, 1994, at A13, available at 1994 WL-WSJ :~34009 (,Were it not 
for Iraq's potential oil earnings, compensation would be unlikely" for those individuals 
and entities damaged as a result of the war). 
33 Neil KingJr., Can the Iraqis Pay the Bill?, WALL ST.]., Aug. 18, 1997, at AI, available at 
1997 WL-WSJ 2431795. 
34 Cohen, supra note 15, at 27. 
35 See id. 
36 Resolution 687, supra note I, at 852,11 16. Resolution 674, the predecessor to Resolu-
tion 687 signed by the Security Council in October 1990, demanded that Iraq cease and 
desist from its illegal wartime conduct and reminded Iraq that it was liable under interna-
tionallaw for any damage it caused. Resolution 674, 29 INT'L 1.. MATERIALS 1560, 1562,111, 
1563,118 (1990); see also Resolution 686, 30 INT'L 1.. MATERIALS 567, 568-69 (1991) (de-
mand on Iraq signed in March 1991). 
37 Resolution 687, supra note I, at 852,1118. 
38 Id.; see also Resolution 692, 30 INT'L 1.. MATERIALS 864, 865, 11 3 (1991) (establishing 
Compensation Fund and Compensation Commission in accordance with the recommen-
dations of the Secretary-General). 
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lowed to resume exporting, the UNCC would retain a percentage of 
its oil revenue in order to pay the damage awards and the UNCC's 
operating costs.39 
The UNCC is a subsidiary branch of the Security Council40 and is 
composed of the Governing Council, the Commissioners, and the 
Secretariat.41 The Governing Council established the criteria for 
compensation of claims and determined the procedures that the 
UNCC would follow in assessing claims and making payments to suc-
cessful claimants.42 Its membership is identical to the membership of 
the Security Counci1.43 The Commissioners, "international jurists and 
other professionals with an established international reputation," re-
view the claims and make recommendations to the Governing Coun-
cil.44 As of December 1998, there were 54 commissioners representing 
40 nationalities.45 The Secretariat provides administrative, technical, 
and legal support to the Governing Council and administers the 
Compensation Fund.46 
A notable structural aspect of the UNCC distinguishes it from 
other international claims tribunals such as the Iran-U.S. Claims Tri-
bunal and the International Court of Justice-the UNCC does not 
employ an adversarial process.47 It is not ajudicial body; rather, it is a 
political and administrative body,48 a "claims resolution facility" aimed 
at "mak[ing] determinations on a large number of claims in a reason-
able time. "49 The UNCC very rarely invites either the claimants or Iraq 
39 Resolution 687, supra note 1, at 852, 1 19. 
40 Alzamora, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
41 The Governing Council, in UNCC, supra note 7; The Commissioners, in UNCC, supra 
note 7; The Secretariat, in UNCC, supra note 7. 
42 The Governing Council, supra note 41. 
43Id. Thus, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. are permanent 
members of the UNCC. Id. They do not, however, have the power to veto compensation 
decisions as they have the power to veto regular Security Council resolutions. Id. UNCC 
decisions are adopted when nine or more members of the Governing Council grant their 
approval. Id. 
44 The Commissioners, supra note 41. 
45Id. 
46 The Secretariat, supra note 41. The Secretal'iat consists of the Executive Secretary, the 
Claims Processing Division, the Support Services Division, and the Governing Council 
Secretariat. Id. 
47 Claims Processing, in UNCC, supra note 7; Charles N. Brower, The Lessons of the Iran-
U.S. Claims Ttilmnal Applied to Claims Against Iraq, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION 
COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 15, 16. 
48 Alzamora, supra note 2, at 8. 
49 Claims Processing, supra note 47. 
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to participate in oral proceedings. 50 Also, all decisions of the UNCC 
are final and binding.51 
C. Payment of Compensation 
Pursuant to Resolution 687, the Security Council determined 
that the UNCC would retain 30% oflraq's oil revenues in order to pay 
the UNCC's operating costs and the successful claims.52 The UNCC 
receives the money from a U.N. created escrow account into which 
importing Member States must pay oil revenues directly.53 In 1989, 
the year before the Gulf War, Iraqi oil revenues totaled $14.5 billion.54 
Thus, ifIraq exported at its 1989 rate, the UNCC would receive 30% 
of$14.5 billion, or $4.35 billion per year. 55 In May 1991, the U.N. sec-
retary-general estimated that this amount would be even higher.56 He 
anticipated that Iraq's 1993 oil revenues would total $21 billion, pro-
viding the UNCC with approximately $6 billion.57 
Exports, however, did not reach this volume; in fact, Iraq did not 
export any oil at all until December 1996.58 In 1991, Iraq rejected an 
offer59 to sell oil made by the Security Council pursuant to Resolution 
706, a resolution authorizing Iraq to receive oil profits of $1.6 billion 
in a one-time-only six month sale period in order to fund the pur-
chase of humanitarian items.60 Thirty percent of those profits would 
have been directed to the UNCC.61 Iraq said the plan would make a 
"'trusteeship oflraq. "'62 
Iraq also did not comply with the U.N. in eliminating its non-
conventional weapons and long-range missile deployment capabili-
50 Id. 
5! Id. 
52 Resolution 705, 30 INT'L L. MATERIALS 1703, 1715, 'll 2 (1991). 
53 UN Security Council Resolution 986 (1995), 35 INT'L L. MATERIALS 1144, 1144 (1996). 
Resolution 986 came four years after Resolution 687, the cease-fire, but governed the first 
oil sales by Iraq since the conflict ended. Id. 
54 See ALNASRAWI, supra note 26, at 93 tb1.5.3. 
55 See id. 
56 William E. Huth, The Iraq C1ilims Tribunal: An Ove1'1Jiew of the u.N. Compensation Com-
mission, 54 DISP. REsoL. J., May 1999, at 25, 83. 
57Id. 
58 Raad Alkadiri, Iraq Under Sanctions: Diminishing Returns, in OIL AND REGIONAL DE-
\'ELOPMENTS IN THE GULF sujJra note 27, at 91, 97. 
59 ALNASRAWI, supra nole 26, al 161. 
60 Id.; Introduction, in UNCC, sujJra note 7. Resolutions 705 and 706 were adopted on 
the same day, August 15, 1991. Introduction, supra. 
6! ALNASRAWI, supra note 26, a1161. 
62Id. 
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ties. 63 The cease-fire agreement stipulated that this compliance was a 
prerequisite to the U.N.'s lifting of the economic sanctions that it had 
imposed on Iraq during the conflict.64 Because Iraq refused to comply 
fully with the U.N. Special Commission weapons inspectors, the U.N. 
did not alleviate the economic embargo, Iraq did not resume export-
ing oil, and the UNCC received no revenues.65 
Prior to December 1996, loans from the U.N. Working Capital 
Fund and from frozen oil revenues held by other countries funded 
the UNCC's operating costs and compensation payments.66 Member 
States that had frozen Iraqi oil revenues when the conflict began 
transferred those revenues to escrow accounts; then, pursuant to 
Resolution 778, the UNCC collected 30% of the amount in those ac-
counts.67 By 1993, the UNCC had collected $21 million from this 
method.68 These two funding sources enabled the UNCC to compen-
sate all claimants who had suffered serious personal injuries, for in-
stance, by December 1996.69 
By 1995, the Iraqi economy had suffered so greatly as a result of 
the economic embarg070 that the U.N. contemplated a system under 
which Iraq could sell oil in exchange for humanitarian goods such as 
food and medicine.7I This scheme, accepted by the Security Council 
in Resolution 986, is known as the oil-for-food program.72 Although 
initially rejected by Iraq in 1995, Iraq changed its position in Decem-
ber 1996 and, for the first time since the beginning of the Gulf War, 
exported oiI.73 Resolution 986 originally allowed Iraqi oil revenues to 
total $4 billion per year.74 Resolution 1284, passed in 1999, removed 
the ceiling.75 In addition, in December 2000, the Security Council 
reduced the percentage of Iraq's oil revenues available for the UNCC 
63 AlkadiJ"i, supra note 58, at 99; see also Resolution 687, supra note 1, 851,'1[ 12, 13. 
64 Alkadiri, supra note 58, at 99; see also Resolution 687, supra note 1, 'I[ 22. 
65 Alkadiri, supra note 58, at 103. 
66 Introduction, supra note 60; David D. Caron, lntroductary Note to United Nations Com-
pensation Commission: Report with Decisions of the Governing Council, 31 INT'L L. MATERIALS 
1009,1010 (1992) (discussing Resolution 778). 
67 Caron, supra note 66, at 1010. 
68 Lea Carol Owen, Note, Between Iraq and a Hard Place: The u.N. Compensation Commis-
sion and its Treatment of Gulf War Claims, 31 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 499, 529 (1998). 
69 Payment Procedure, in UNCC, supra note 7. 
70 Alkadiri, supra note 58, at 97. 
71 ld. 
72 ld. 
73 lei. 
74 ld. 
75 Payment Procedure, supra note 69. 
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to 25% because of humanitarian concerns about the situation in 
Iraq.76 
D. The Claims 
The UNCC received approximately 2.6 million claims77 prior to 
the May 1998 filing deadline.78 The UNCC divided these claims into 
six categories, A through F, and considered them in order of humani-
tarian need; A, B, and C Category claims were most pressing.79 The 
UNCC has resolved all of the Category A, B, and C claims.80 
1. Individual Losses: Categories A, B, C, and D 
Category A claims are departure claims of individuals who had to 
leave Kuwait or Iraq between the date of the invasion and the cease-
fire. 81 The UNCC received approximately 920,000 Category A claims 
requesting approximately $3.6 billion and has awarded $3.2 billion to 
approximately 860,000 claimants.82 
Category B claims are claims for serious personal injury or the 
death of a spouse, child, or parent.83 The UNCC received approxi-
mately 6000 of these claims requesting $21 million; 4000 claimants 
succeeded and received a total of$13 million.84 
Category C claims, of which there were 420,000 requesting $9 
billion in compensation, are for individual damages up to $100,000.85 
Individual damages range from mental pain and anguish to loss of 
stock to loss of real property.86 The UNCC awarded approximately 
$4.9 million to Category C claimants.87 
Category D claims still are being considered.88 These 10,500 
claims are the same as the Category C claims, except damages claimed 
76Id. 
77 The Claims, supra note 7. Although the claims are those of individuals, entities, and 
governments, all of the claims wel-e filed by govenunents on behalf of those within their 
jurisdictions, as mandated by the UNCC. Alzamora, sUj,ra note 2, at 8. 
78 Clllims Processing, supra note 47. 
79Id. 
80 Status of Claims Processing, in UNCC, supra note 7. 
81 Category ";\" Claims, in UNCC, supra note 7. 
82Id. 
83 Category "B" Claims, in UNCC, supra note 7. 
84Id. 
85 Category "C" Claims, in UNCC, supra note 7. 
86Id. 
87Id_ 
88 Status of Claims Processing, supra note 80. 
300 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 24:291 
exceed $lOO,000.89 The most prevalent claims are for loss of personal 
and real property, loss ofincome, and business losses.9o 
2. Corporate and Government Losses: Categories E and F 
Category E and F claims are the most complex and also still are 
being considered.91 Category E claims are from corporations, other 
private legal entities, and public sector enterprises; they cover dam-
ages such as contract losses and lost profits.92 Category E entities filed 
5800 claims seeking $80 billion.93 Category F claims, government 
claims,94 total 300 and request $210 billion.95 These claims include 
damage to governmental property and the environment.96 
As of January 2001, the UNCC had awarded $32.2 billion and 
had paid $11 billion to claimants in Categories A through F.97 Fur-
thermore, the UNCC has addressed virtually all of the 2.6 million 
claims; only 12,000 remain to be resolved.98 Although the remaining 
claimants request damages of $223 billion, the majority are Category 
E and F claimants.99 
II. THE UNCC AS PRECEDENT FOR THE IMPOSITION OF CIVIL 
LIABILITY FOR WARTIME DAMAGES 
The U.N. most likely will rely on the UNCC as precedent for the 
imposition of civil liability for wartime damages in future conflicts. 1Oo 
First, the success of the UNCC's efforts to date in civilly compensating 
89 Category ''0'' Claims, supra note 7. 
90 [d. 
91 Status of Claims Processing, supra note 80. 
92 Category ''E'' Claims, in UNCC, supra note 7. Category E claims include oil sector 
claims (EI), claims of Kuwaiti corporations unrelated to oil (E4), claims of non-Kuwaiti 
corporations relating to construction and engineering but not relating to oil (E3), and an 
"other" subcategory (E2). [d. 
93Id. 
94 Category "F" Claims, in UNCC, supra note 7. 
95Id. 
96 Id. CategOl'y F claims are divided into fOllr {'ategories: F4 for damage to the envi-
ronment, F3 for damage to the Kuwaiti government (includes damage to property and 
(,OIHract losses), F2 for damage to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and Fl for all other govern-
ment claims related to the evanlation of dtizens and damage to property. Id. There is also 
an ElF Category {'overing export guarantee and insurance claims. Id. 
97 Status of Claims Processing, supra note 80. 
98Id. 
99Id. 
100 See Kirgis, supra note 4, at 113-15 (discussing possible precedential value of Resolu-
tion 687). 
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the victims of the Gulf War is apparent; the UNCC has paid claimants 
approximately one-third of the amount it has awarded so far and has 
addressed almost all of the claims. IOI Second, the permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council explicitly rejected a proposed amend-
ment to the Gulf War cease-fire agreement that would have held the 
Gulf War unique and the remedies lacking precedential value.102 The 
U.N.'s ability to establish civil compensation systems, however, is lim-
ited by two factors: the economic feasibility of that compensationl03 
and the extent of the U.N.'s authority over the acts of aggression that 
give rise to the damages. 104 
A. The Economic Feasibility of Civil Compensation far Wartime Damages 
A compensation system comparable to the one that exists for the 
Gulf War victims is economically feasible only in very limited circum-
stances. A comparison between the economies of Iraq and Serbia 
helps define these circumstances and illustrates that a number of fac-
tors, together, determines whether a country could be the compensat-
ing party in a civil compensation system. In order to be the compen-
sating party, a country must have some form of wealthl05 that has a 
high degree of liquidity,lo6 that was not destroyed during the 
conflict,I07 that is easily accessible to the U.N.,IOS and that is not pri-
vately owned. 
1. Wealth 
First and most apparent, a country must have some form of 
wealth sufficient to pay a sizable portion of the claims and to fund the 
system itself.l09 The U.N. will not subject a country to a civil compen-
sation system simply as an exercise in politics because there is "little 
point in creating a UN compensation commission for conflicts where 
there is no prospect of actually compensating anyone."110 The U.N. 
IOIId. 
102Id. at 113 n.45. The amendment said, "the circumstances [of the Persian Gulf War 
are] unique, requiring unprecedented actions 'which do not set undue pn~cedents.'" Id. 
103 See King, supra note 33, at AI. 
104 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. 
105 See King, supra note 33, at AI. 
106 See generally, Kirgis, supra note 4, at 115. 
107 See CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, supra 1Iote 9, at 84. 
108 See Kirgis, supra note 4. at 115. 
109 King, supra note 33, at AI. 
110 Kirgis, supra 1Iote 4, at 115. 
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already has hinted at its unwillingness to hold an aggressor nation civ-
illy liable in the absence of any realistic ability to pay.11l In 1997, a 
delegation from Bosnia visited the head of the UNCC and inquired 
whether a civil compensation system similar to the one in place for 
the Gulf War could be instituted to help the Bosnian victims.l12 Jean-
Claude Aime suggested that Serbia's lack of wealth was prohibitive. ll3 
In 1990, pre-war lligoslavia's gross domestic product (GDP) 114 for 
the combined lligoslav republics totaled $55 billion.1l5 In Serbia, the 
GDP per capita116 for the same year was approximately $2,700,117 In-
dustrial manufacturing provided most of Serbia's wealth, accounting 
for approximately 45% of its 1990 GDP.llS Services were the next larg-
est contributor, and agriculture accounted for another 15%.119 Before 
Yugoslavia dissolved, Serbia was economically dependent on its 
neighboring provinces; it also did not have (and still does not have) 
any highly valuable natural resources.120 
Iraq, unlike Serbia, is an ideal country for the imposition of a 
civil compensation system121 because it possesses significant wealth in 
the form of a natural resource, oil.122 Oil production has dominated 
the Iraqi economy since the 1950s.123 Between 1973 and 1982, Iraq 
and the other Middle Eastern oil producing countries experienced 
great prosperity as a result of increased revenues from the export of 
[d. 
III King, supra note 33, at AI. 
112 [d. 
113 See id. A delegation from Rwanda visited, as well, and received the same prognosis. 
114 Gross domestic product is the total market value of all goods and services produced 
in a country by the factors of production located in that country, regardless of who owns 
the factors of production. KARL E. CASE & RAy C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 613 
(1992). Factors of production are land, labor, and capital. [d. at 71. Gross national prod-
uct, in contrast, is the total market value of all goods and services produced in a country by 
the factors of production owned by a country's citizens. [d. at 611. 
115 CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 9, at 84. 
116 Per capita GDP is GDP divided by the country's population. CASE & FAIR, supra 
note 114, at 627. 
117 CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 9, at 84. 
118 [d. 
119 [d. 
120 Cohen, supra note 15, at 27. 
121 See id. 
122 THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, IRAQ: COUNTRY PROFILE 1992-93, at 20 
(1992) [hereinafter EIU]. 
123 [d. at 9. 
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crude oil, natural gas, and refined products. I24 During these years, 
referred to as the "oil decade," Iraqi oil revenues ranged from a low of 
$1.8 billion in 1973 to a high of$26.0 billion in 1980.125 
Though the "oil decade" had ended, Iraq was still a wealthy na-
tion around the time of the Gulf War.I26 In 1990, Iraq's oil reserves 
constituted 10% of the total world oil reserves.I27 Furthermore, in 
1989, Iraq's GDP totaled $66.4 billionI28 of which oil earnings ac-
counted for 61 %, followed by services, industry, and agriculture. I29 
More importantly, the revenue generated from the export of oil con-
sistently has accounted for more than 90% of Iraq's export earn-
ings,I30 and Iraqi oil revenues generally account for at least 98% of 
total government revenue.I31 If Iraq did not possess this wealth, the 
U.N. would not have subjected it to a civil compensation system.132 
2. Liquidity 
Before the U.N. can subject a nation to a civil compensation sys-
tem, not only must that nation possess some form of wealth, but that 
wealth also must have a high degree of liquidity.I33 If a country, for 
example, were rich in oil but did not have the capacity to produce 
that oil, the U.N. would be taking an extraordinary step if it either 
seized the raw natural resource or forced the owner nation to develop 
the means to export the resource for the purpose of funding a com-
pensation system. The U.N. most likely never will take either of these 
steps. 
The U.N. has demonstrated, however, that it is capable of forcing 
an unwilling payer, such as Iraq, that has the capacity to generate a 
highly liquid asset to generate that asset notwithstanding its unwill-
ingness. I34 The U.N.'s actions toward Iraq between 1991 and 1996 are 
124 GAD G. GILBAR, THE MIDDLE EASTERN OIL DECADE AND BEYOND 1 (1997). The oil 
producing countries that experienced the greatest wealth during these times were Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates. Id. at 3. 
125Id. at 1. 
126 See EIU, supra note 122, at 20. 
127 Id. In addition, the country is rich in natural gas. !d. In 1990, Iraq's gas reserves ac-
counted for 2.4% of the total world reserves. !d. 
128 ALNASRAWI, supra note 26, at 93 tbI.5.3. 
129 EIU, supra note 122, at 13. 
130Id. at 20; Alkadiri, supra note 58, at 92. 
131 THE STATIONARY OFFICE, WHITAKER'S ALMANAC 2000, at 909 (2000). 
132 See King, supra note 33, at AI. 
133 See generally, Kirgis, supra note 4, at 115. 
134 See Alkadiri, supra note 58, at 95. 
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illustrative.135 Prior to 1996, although the U.N. permitted Iraq to sell 
oil according to the terms of the oil-for-food arrangement, Iraq did 
not do so because Saddam Hussein found that the arrangement in-
fringed upon Iraq's sovereignty.136 During these years, the U.N. main-
tained against Iraq "the most extensive and rigidly enforced interna-
tional sanctions regime in modern history. "137 As a result, Iraq had 
experienced socio-economic collapse by 1996.138 CDP plummeted,139 
inflation soared,140 health care suffered,141 and malnutrition became 
prevalent. 142 Nonetheless, the U.N. continued the embargo until Iraq 
acquiesced to the oil-for-food deal,l43 The U.N. action taken toward 
Iraq between 1991 and 1996 suggests that, in the future, the U.N. will 
not refrain from imposing civil liability on a wealthy nation simply be-
cause the leaders of that nation are willing to jeopardize their econ-
omy and the welfare of their citizens in order to avoid payment. l44 
3. Retention of Wealth 
Furthermore, the U.N. could not subject to a civil compensation 
system a nation that has not retained its wealth or the potential to 
generate wealth after the conflict. 145 Serbia, for instance, no longer is 
able to generate revenue in the ways it did prior to the war (or in any 
new ways) .146 Most factories-crucial to industrial manufacturing-
have closed.147 Only the "evasion of U.N. sanctions and the country's 
agricultural self-sufficiency have kept it afloat."148 In addition, Serbia's 
lack of capital for new investment has prevented it from rebuilding 
the infrastructure and productive capacity necessary for a return to 
industrial manufacturing.149 
135 See ALNASRAWI, supra note 26, at 161. 
136Id. 
137 Alkadiri, supra note 58, at 91. 
138 Id. at 92-95. 
139 Id. at 93. 
140 Id. at 93. 
141 Id. at 96. 
142 Alkadil"i, supra note 58, at 95. 
143Id. at 97. 
144Id. 
145 See generally CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 9, at 84. 
146Id. 
147 WORLD ALMANAC BOOKS, THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2000, at 1070 
(2000). 
148Id. 
149 CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 9, at 84. 
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Iraq, in contrast, remains a wealthy nation even though its econ-
omy has been devastated by the U.N. sanctions still imposed on it; it 
maintains the potential to exploit the natural resource that lies be-
neath its land.150 Mter the Gulf War, as evidenced by its current ability 
to export oil, Iraq retained both its oil and at least a minimal capacity 
to prepare that oil for exportation notwithstanding the damage 
caused by the U.N. air campaign.t51 This favorable outcome for Iraq 
can be contrasted with the extensive damage Iraq inflicted upon Ku-
wait's oil resources.152 As the Iraqi troops retreated from Kuwait, they 
ignited 727 oil wells, damaging more than 90% of the producing wells 
in that country.153 Iflraq's natural resource had suffered similarly, the 
U.N.'s imposition of civil liability most likely would depend on, first, 
the amount of oil remaining and, second, the practicality and cost of 
Iraq's repairing the damage and resuming exporting. 
4. Accessibility to the U.N. 
Next, the liable nation's wealth must be easily accessible to the 
U.N. because "a claims process is not likely to produce much actual 
compensation unless the respondent has a source of funds that can be 
generated or tapped outside its territory. "154 Wealth derived from for-
eign trade is the most amenable to diversion by the U.N.155 Mter the 
Gulf War, the U.N. redirected a portion of Iraq's oil revenues into the 
UNCC simply by mandating that all nations to which the U.N. permit-
ted Iraq to sell oil pay the revenues that would otherwise go to Iraq 
into an escrow account.156 The procedural simplicity of the diversion 
of funds should be attributed to the fact that the funds constituted 
foreign trade revenue.157 Providing for civil compensation through 
foreign trade revenue is attractive because the U.N. need not inter-
fere with a country's internal affairs in order to receive the funds. 15s 
For example, if the wealth of a nation originates not from foreign 
trade but from internal transactions such as the taxation of individual 
150 See Alkadiri, supra note 58, at 97. 
151 See id. 
152 Sl'e MARY ANN TETREAULT, THE KUWAIT PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND THE Eco-
NOMICS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER 142 (1995); see generalZy Roger P. Alford, Well Blowout 
Control Claim, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 287 (1998). 
153 TETREAULT, supra note 152, at 142. 
154 Kirgis, supra note 4, at 115. 
155 See id. 
156 UN Security Council Resolution 986, supra note 53. 
157 See id. 
158 See Kirgis, supra note 4, at 155. 
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and corporate income, the U.N. will have greater difficulty gaining 
access to that wealth.l59 Quite possibly, the only way the U.N. could 
receive assets earned though internal transactions would be by impos-
ing severe sanctions on a country, thereby forcing it to "voluntarily" 
relinquish a portion of its assets. I60 
5. Public Wealth 
Finally, before the U.N. can impose a civil compensation system, 
a nation must have wealth that is not privately owned; the government 
itself must have assets or income. If private individuals or entities pos-
sess the wealth of the country and those individuals or entities are not 
civilly liable to the victims of the conflict, a civil compensation system 
should fail for two reasons. 
First, it is doubtful that the U.N. has the authority to appropriate 
private revenues in the absence of liability; possibly, the U.N. does not 
have this authority even when liability exits. In Iraq, the U.N. has not 
encountered any difficulty that can be attributed to the private owner-
ship of wealth in its collection of the UNCC judgments because oil 
production is nationalized; the Iraq National Oil Company controls 
the industry.I61 The effect ofIraq's having a national oil sector is that 
the country's leaders can appropriate to the government the entire 
spread between the costs of oil production and the sale price of that 
oil. I62 Thus, because all oil revenue is government owned and because 
it is the government that is civilly liable under the cease-fire, the U.N. 
is able to redirect revenues to the UNCC.I63 
Second, ifthe U.N. does have the authority to appropriate private 
revenues in the absence of liability, the imposition of such a scheme 
would constitute troubling precedent for international law and thus 
would prompt Member States to oppose it. Because the UNCC is the 
first compensation system of its kind, it cannot be determined 
definitively whether the U.N. would attempt to collect a civil judg-
ment from a country whose wealth was privately owned. It is unlikely, 
however, that the U.N. would go so far as to seize private wealth to 
satisfy a judgment against the country. For example, if Iraq's oil and 
productive capacity were owned by a variety of private companies and 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
161 ALNASRAWI, sufrra note 26, at 12. The Iraq National Oil company was created in 
1964.Id. 
162 [d. 
163 See grmerally Resolution 687, sufrra note 1. 
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private multi-nationals,164 the U.N. probably would not attempt to di-
rect those revenues into an escrow account with the intent to seize a 
percentage. 
This conclusion remains unaltered even though the U.N. is able 
to impose sanctions against the entire aggressor country and, there-
fore, indirectly can prevent from occurring any wealth generating pri-
vate transactions involving international parties.165 Imposing sanctions 
on a country as a whole because of the acts of the government is fun-
damentally different from imposing punishment directly on private 
individuals to compensate for the acts of the government. Member 
States would oppose private asset seizure because private entities 
within their borders would pressure them to do so. 
B. U.N. Authority Over Acts of Aggression 
There are two aspects of the Gulf War cease-fire agreement that 
may limit the U.N. 's imposition of civil compensation systems in the 
future. First, the Gulf War is a case of "naked aggression by one state 
against another, where the basic principle of State Responsibility is 
clear. "166 Second, Iraq technically consented to the creation of the 
UNCC.l67 It is unlikely, however, that the U.N. will construe the 
UNCC precedent narrowly and restrict its imposition of civil liability 
to conflicts involving aggression similar to that taken by Iraq or to 
conflicts after which the aggressor agrees to compensate its victims. 
1. Acts of Aggression 
Iraq's actions in invading Kuwait placed it squarely within the 
provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter that prohibits aggres-
sion by one independent state against the territorial integrity of an-
other independent state.l68 Instances of naked aggression such as 
those present in the Gulf War, however, occur infrequently in interna-
164 Until the 1960's, private multi-national oil companies owned a portion of the oil 
and production capacity in Iraq. See ALNASRAW1, supra note 26, at 12. Iraq, however, made 
a concentrated effort to free the oil wealth from foreign and private control and, in 1967, 
the Iraq National Oil Company was granted the exclusive right to exploit the country's oil 
resources. [d. 
165 U.N. CHARTER art. 41. 
166 Kirgis, supra note 4, at 113. 
167 [d. at 106. 
168 Gordon A. Christenson, State Responsibility and the UN Compensation Commission: 
Compensating Victims of Crimes of State, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMIS-
SION, supra note 2, at 311,311-12. 
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tional relations.l69 Thus, the value of the UNCC as precedent would 
be greatly diminished if the U.N. limited civil compensation to these 
instances. Instead, the U.N. should interpret the UNCC precedent 
broadly and extend its principles to any instance in which the U.N. 
takes action under Chapter VII (granting the U.N. the authority to 
maintain and restore international peace and securityl70) such as the 
use of force or the imposition of sanctions. The UNCC should be 
viewed as a mechanism by which international peace and security is 
restored; Iraq is paying reparations to its victims in order to restore 
them, ideally, to their pre-war situations. l7l Thus, in a conflict such as 
the break-up of the former Yugoslavia where the U.N. took Chapter 
VII action, international law should allow the U.N. to impose civilli-
ability as well.172 
One author has suggested that, under the doctrine of State Re-
sponsibility for emergent governments, the U.N. even might extend 
UNCC precedent to the victor in a civil war if the U.N. subjected that 
victor to Chapter VII actions during the war.173 Extending that reason-
ing, UNCC precedent also may be available where the U.N. could 
have but did not take Chapter VII action during the course of a 
conflict.174 If the justification for the imposition of civil compensation 
rests with the U.N.'s power to restore international peace and security, 
the U.N.'s lack of involvement during a conflict would not necessarily 
bear on its authority to act upon the termination of that conflict. l75 
2. Consent of the Aggressor 
Not only will the U.N. most likely not be limited by a naked ag-
gression prerequisite to the imposition of civil liability, it also most 
likely will not be limited by a consent prerequisite. l76 Iraq did consent 
to the provisions of the cease-fire agreement, but it did so only be-
cause '''it had no choice but to accept [them]."'l77 The U.N., however, 
should not have needed to elicit Iraq's rancorous consent before 
169 Kirgis, supra note 4, at 113. 
170 U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. 
171 Christenson, supra note 168, at 312. 
172 Kirgis, supra note 4, at 114 (suggesting it would be a "short step" to the imposition 
of a UNCC for \'iigoslavia). 
173Id. 
174 See id.; see generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. 
175 See generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. 
176 See Kirgis, supra note 4, at 106. 
177 See id. 
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holding it civilly liable for the damage it caused.178 Civil liability is a 
means of restoring international peace and security in the same way 
that U.N. sanctions and the use of force are means of doing so.179 
Thus, in the same way that the U.N. can impose sanctions on or use 
force against a Member State that violates the U.N. Charter-without 
its consent-so should the U.N. be able to impose civil liability with-
out the consent of the aggressor state.180 
III. THE RISING COSTS OF ILLEGAL CONFLICT AND THEIR POTENTIAL 
TO DETER 
Traditionally, the expenses that an aggressor nation incurs as a 
result of an illegal conflict include the costs of waging the war,181 the 
internal costs stemming from reconstruction,182 probable submission 
to U.N. sanctions,183 and possible criminal prosecution of the nations' 
leaders by an international war crimes tribunaL184 This last possibility 
is remote, as there were no internationally organized war crime tribu-
nals in place between the time of the Nuremberg trials and the Yugo-
slavian war crimes trials.185 Neither Saddam Hussein nor other Iraqi 
leaders has been tried for international war crimes.186 
The possibility of a successful civil suit, brought by a plaintiff in 
his country of origin against the aggressor nation as a whole or 
against leaders of the nation individually, has proved equally re-
mote.187 In 1994, for example, two sets of plaintiffs filed suits under 
the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victims Protection Actl88 
against Radovan Karadzic, the leader of Srpska-a Serbian area of 
Bosnia-in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York.189 Even if these types of suits result in judgments entered 
against a foreign aggressor, the likelihood that the aggressor will pay 
178 See Christenson, supra note 168, at 322. 
179 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. 
180 See id. 
181 CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, supm note 9, at 324. 
182Id. 
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185Id. 
186 John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission of International Crimes as an Alterna-
tive to Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 1, 15-16 (1999). 
187 See id. at 28-29. 
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the judgment is slim.190 "In [civil] suits against individuals and gov-
ernments, plaintiffs have encountered extreme difficulties in collect-
ing on their judgments. "191 
With the creation and the subsequent success of the UNCC, the 
costs of illegal conflict for wealthy nations increased significantly.192 If 
the UNCC precedent is construed broadly, countries with wealth or 
assets will face a significant likelihood of being forced to civilly com-
pensate those individuals and entities that they injure during the 
course of conflicts.193 Although individual war criminals will be no 
more likely than they were previously to pay judgments rendered 
against them, the collection of judgments against aggressor nations 
will alleviate the necessity for civil suits against the individual perpe-
trators of war crimes.194 
The potential increase in the economic costs of conflicts for 
wealthy nations should deter some of those nations from engaging in 
illegal aggression in which they otherwise might engage.195 Although 
action based on deterrence is outside the scope of the U.N. Charter-
deterrence does not constitute maintenance or restoration of interna-
tional peace and security196-U.N. action that has the dual effect of 
restoration and deterrence is not only permissible but ideal,l97 Carlos 
Alzamora, executive secretary of the UNCC, said in 1994 that "the 
message of the international community, via the U.N., is that not only 
does 'aggression not pay, you have to pay for it. "'198 Though deter-
rence is nearly impossible to measure-it is difficult to know when 
and why nations are refraining from illegal conduct-the potential 
imposition of U.N. sanctions most likely has deterred some nations 
from engaging in illegal conduct.199 Similarly, nations for whom civil 
compensation would be economically feasible will consider that there 
now exists an additional and substantial cost to war that did not exist 
prior to the Gulf War. 200 
190 Murphy, supra note 186. at 28. 
191Id. 
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Of course, there are some nations for whom the potential imposi-
tion of a civil compensation system can have no deterrent effect: those 
nations for whom civil compensation is not economically feasible. 201 
These nations have no more to lose after the creation of the UNCC 
than they did before its creation.202 Serbia falls into this category be-
cause it does not have the wealth necessary to pay any judgments ren-
dered against it.203 Thus, Serbia need not be wary of such judg-
ments. 204 
In addition to deterring wealthy U.N. Member States generally, 
the creation and success of the UNCC also should deter Iraq 
specifically. The monetary value of the UNCC claims that remain sug-
gests that the U.N. will force Iraq to contribute to the Compensation 
Fund indefinitely.205 When its obligations end, Iraq should hesitate 
before engaging in another illegal act of aggression. However, any de-
terrent effect of civil compensation will cease, and will transform into 
a catalyst for aggression, when the liable nation feels as if it has noth-
ing to lose. As a result, the U.N. must proceed cautiously in its future 
imposition of civil compensation systems and also must monitor Iraq's 
economic situation closely. 
Important in this respect is the percentage of a country's assets 
that the U.N. appropriates and directs toward a compensation system. 
In the case of Iraq, 25% seems reasonable standing alone but appears 
less so when coupled with the crushing effects of the sanctions simul-
taneously in place.206 The concurrent imposition of economic sanc-
tions and a civil compensation system has the ironic effect of prevent-
ing those who would be compensated in the absence of the sanctions 
from receiving compensation. Although Iraq's non-compliance with 
weapons inspections justifies the continued sanctions, as specified in 
the cease-fire, the alleviation or lifting of the sanctions, when that day 
comes, means that Iraq could resume exporting oil at a steady volume 
and thus, could provide a steady stream of revenue to the UNCC. 
CONCLUSION 
The UNCC has compensated, and will continue to compensate, 
victims of the Gulf War who otherwise would bear their losses without 
201 See Kirgis, supra note 4, at 115. 
202 See id. 
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assistance, as do the victims of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. 
In this respect, the UNCC is a success and will serve as a precedent for 
U.N. action in the future to the extent that the economics of the ag-
gressor nation do not thwart the imposition of a civil compensation 
system. What remains to be determined is whether the UNCC reaches 
too far into Iraq's economy. The next few years will reveal whether the 
U.N. provoked Iraq to act irrationally-whether it stripped the coun-
try of so much that it had nothing left to lose. If Iraq has nothing left 
to lose, this revelation ultimately will define the scope of the UNCC as 
precedent. 
